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KEEPING GOOD FAITH IN DIPLOMACY: 
NEGOTIATION AND JURISDICTION IN THE 
ICJ’S APPLICATION OF THE CERD 
William P. Lane* 
Abstract: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) refused jurisdiction in 
Georgia’s suit against Russia under the Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, finding that the treaty’s jurisdictional 
clause, which limits jurisdiction to unsettled disputes, did not apply in the 
absence of good-faith negotiation. The court reversed its provisional 
measures order, which entertained jurisdiction, and continued a line of 
cases holding that clauses like the treaty’s jurisdictional clause serve main-
ly to give the parties notice of the dispute. The ICJ’s ruling noted that 
these clauses also reflect limits on parties’ consent to jurisdiction and a 
general preference for negotiated solutions. This suggests that the court 
will scrutinize attempted diplomacy more in the future to ensure good-
faith conduct. Yet the court refused to overturn precedents permitting 
use of open forums such as the UN and finding negotiations where the 
specific treaty obligations are not identified, making good faith harder to 
ensure. The ICJ’s adherence to a more flexible standard thus still pro-
vides a way for complainants to satisfy jurisdictional thresholds without 
fully engaging respondents beforehand. 
Introduction 
 On April 1, 2011, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed 
Georgia’s claims of ethnic cleansing, citing a lack of jurisdiction.1 Geor-
gia’s application alleged that Russian forces had turned a blind eye to, 
and even participated in, the expulsion of ethnic Georgians from the 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thereby violating Rus-
sia’s obligations under the International Convention on the Prevention 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).2 The decision hinged on 
Georgia’s failure to attempt to resolve the issue through negotiation 
                                                                                                                      
* William P. Lane is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Application of Int’l Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Geor. v. Russ.), Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 184 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Racial Discrimi-
nation Judgment]. 
2 Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 
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with the Russian Federation prior to filing its application, which was 
held to preclude exercise of jurisdiction under Article 22 of the CERD.3 
The ICJ, in its ruling, reversed its provisional measures order, where it 
found that contacts mentioning the parties’ dispute could be sufficient 
to give rise to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.4 
 The ICJ’s judgment runs counter to a trend in the court toward 
reading “compromissory clauses” liberally to find jurisdiction more fre-
quently.5 The court’s early jurisprudence suggested that the court 
should only adjudicate disputes that could not be resolved diplomati-
cally.6 Nevertheless, more recent decisions addressing the question of 
negotiation preconditions have permitted access to the ICJ upon rais-
ing the dispute in a public forum without recourse to direct diplo-
macy.7 Thus, the court’s decision on Georgia’s application may signal a 
return to the view that the ICJ exists as a last resort for cases arising un-
der such treaties.8 
 Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the history of tensions 
between Georgia and Russia surrounding the regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. In addition, this Part recounts the procedural history of 
Georgia’s application to the ICJ under the CERD, and the court’s rul-
ing thereon. Part II outlines the role of compromissory clause jurisdic-
tion, and the limiting function performed by negotiations as a precon-
dition. In particular, this Part explores the degree to which states must 
exhaust diplomatic remedies before the court may be properly en-
gaged. Part III analyzes the potential impact of the decision on states’ 
use of negotiations prior to adjudication. This Part also analyzes wheth-
er some of the court’s stated aims would have been better served by a 
more dramatic break from current jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. ¶ 182. 
4 See Application of Int’l Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶¶ 115–117 (Oct. 15). 
5 David J. Scheffer, Non-Judicial State Remedies and the Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice, 27 Stan. J. Int’l L. 83, 140–42 (1990). “A compromissory clause obligates the 
parties to a treaty to adjudicate disputes under the treaty before the Court, usually after all 
other attempts to resolve the dispute have failed.” Id. at 85–86 n.14. 
6 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 15 (Aug. 30). 
7 See Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 160; South West Africa (Liber. v. S. 
Afr.; Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 344–46 (Dec. 21). 
8 See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 139–40. 
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I. Background 
A. Overview of the Russia-Georgia Conflict 
 When the U.S.S.R. began to dissolve in 1991, the regions of Geor-
gia known as South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared independence from 
Georgia, eventually leading to armed conflict.9 During the conflict, 
much of the regions’ ethnic Georgian populations were either killed or 
forced from their homes by the fighting.10 In 1992, Georgia and South 
Ossetia signed a series of agreements providing for peaceful settlement 
of the dispute, and establishing a peacekeeping force that included 
Georgians, Ossetians, and Russians.11 In May 1994, Abkhazia and Geor-
gia, with the Russian Federation acting as mediator, signed a peace 
agreement mandating the return of displaced persons.12 The agree-
ment was to be monitored by a peacekeeping force headed by the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a regional organization 
made up of several former Soviet republics.13 Although the independ-
ence of either South Ossetia or Abkhazia has not been widely recog-
nized, Russia keeps ties with both regions by circumventing economic 
restrictions, and thus tacitly supporting independence, which has in 
turn caused friction with Georgia.14 
 The unstable relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia 
broke in August 2008, when Georgia used artillery fire in an attempt to 
strike at separatist forces in South Ossetia.15 Russia responded by 
launching a large-scale intervention into Georgia which included several 
airstrikes.16 The international community responded quickly; France 
                                                                                                                      
9 Abkhazia, Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Org. (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www. 
unpo.org/article/7854. 
10 Id. 
11 Jim Nichol, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34618, Russia-Georgia Conflict in 
South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests 1 (2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110841.pdf. 
12 Application of Int’l Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (Geor. v. Russ.), Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 46–47 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Racial 
Discrimination Judgment]. 
13 Id. 
14 Daria Vaisman, Russia, Georgia Rattle Sabers over Ossetia, Christian Sci. Monitor, 
Aug. 1, 2006, at 6; Russia Lifts Trade, Economic, Financial Sanctions on Abkhazia–2, RIA No-
vosti (Mar. 06, 2008, 8:52 PM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080306/100855697.html. 
15 Michael Schwirtz et al., Russia and Georgia Clash over Separatist Region, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 9, 2008, at A1. 
16 Id. 
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and Russia immediately crafted a six-point ceasefire that was signed by 
Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Russia by August 16th.17 
B. Procedural History of the Georgia-Russia Dispute 
 The Georgian government submitted an application against Russia 
to the ICJ on August 12, 2008, based on violations of the CERD, to 
which Georgia acceded in 1999.18 In its application, the Georgian gov-
ernment alleged that Russian peacekeepers had failed to take the 
measures required by the CERD to help refugees return to their 
homes.19 Furthermore, Georgia accused the Russian Federation of both 
encouraging and directly participating in ethnic cleansing through var-
ious methods including forced migration.20 
 Georgia requested provisional measures from the ICJ as a means to 
forestall irreparable harm from Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists.21 
Among other demands, Georgia requested that the court order the 
Russian Federation to take affirmative measures to promote the return 
of displaced Georgians and to prevent further discriminatory acts by 
Abkhaz and Ossetian rebels.22 Russia disputed ICJ jurisdiction, claiming 
that Georgia was essentially protesting Russia’s use of military force un-
der the guise of a CERD claim, and that Georgia had not attempted to 
negotiate the issue with Russia sufficiently to allow the court to find ju-
risdiction.23 
 The court addressed Russia’s questions of jurisdiction by holding 
that CERD Article 22,24 the clause conferring ICJ jurisdiction over dis-
putes “not settled by negotiation,” does not require formal diplomacy 
                                                                                                                      
17 Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 107. 
18 Id. ¶ 34. 
19 Id. ¶ 17. 
20 Id. 
21 Application of Int’l Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶¶ 23–25 (Oct. 15) 
[hereinafter Racial Discrimination Order]. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. ¶ 83. 
24 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
art. 22, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negociation 
[sic] or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at 
the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another 
mode of settlement. 
Id. 
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between the parties.25 Although the court did not fully discern the facts 
at the provisional measures stage, it found that the allegations demon-
strated a threat of ongoing racial discrimination.26 On October 15, 
2008, the court voted 8–7 to order the provisional measures requested 
by Georgia.27 
 Russia raised four preliminary objections: first, that there was no 
dispute relating to the CERD; second, that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction 
because Georgia failed to negotiate; third, that the CERD did not apply 
to extraterritorial acts; and fourth, that the ICJ could not hear claims 
alleging CERD violations before 1999, when Georgia became a party to 
the CERD.28 
 In its decision of April 1, 2011, the court found that a dispute re-
garding the CERD had arisen between the parties as of August 2008, 
when the Georgian government accused Russia of ethnic cleansing.29 
Nevertheless, the court refused to consider communication between 
the parties prior to 2008 as evidence of a dispute, as all accusations of 
ethnic cleansing referred to Russia solely in its role as a CIS peace-
keeper, and not as a participant.30 In considering Russia’s second objec-
tion, the ICJ reversed its holding in the provisional order, finding that 
the reference to negotiations in Article 22 required a genuine attempt 
by Georgia to resolve the dispute.31 Because Georgia made no effort to 
negotiate before filing its application, the ICJ declined to exercise ju-
risdiction by a 10–6 vote.32 
II. Discussion 
A. Negotiation and Jurisdiction: The Court’s Jurisprudence 
 The ICJ does not automatically have jurisdiction over any dispute 
arising between nations.33 The ICJ statute states that jurisdiction over a 
dispute may only exist by an ad hoc agreement between the parties to 
the dispute, by the parties’ consent to compulsory jurisdiction, or by a 
                                                                                                                      
25 Id.; see Racial Discrimination Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 115. 
26 Racial Discrimination Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶¶ 141–143. 
27 Id. ¶ 149. 
28 Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 22. 
29 Id. ¶ 113. 
30 See id. ¶ 104. 
31 See id. ¶ 157. 
32 See id. ¶¶ 182–184, 187. 
33 See Dan Hammer, Comment, Allowing Genocide?: An Analysis of Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdictional Reservations, and the Legitimacy of the International 
Court of Justice, 16 Minn. J. Int’l L. 495, 497–98 (2007). 
38 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
treaty provision giving the court jurisdiction over disputes under that 
treaty.34 Although this regime leaves many areas in which the ICJ lacks 
jurisdiction, it reflects an international commitment to the basic prin-
ciple that a state’s sovereignty may only be diminished by its consent.35 
Truly compulsory jurisdiction over the acts of individual states would 
infringe on the sovereignty of those states, depriving them of the right 
to settle their affairs as they please.36 
 Recently, states have become less willing to submit to compulsory 
jurisdiction under the ICJ, instead favoring the use of “compromissory” 
treaty clauses.37 The typical compromissory clause gives the court juris-
diction to hear disputes regarding the interpretation of the relevant 
agreement.38 The clause restricts the bounds of the court’s jurisdiction 
to those aspects of an issue related to the treaty, in theory preventing 
the court from passing unsought judgment on a dispute’s broader po-
litical context.39 A narrow scope of treaty rights restricts the focus of the 
court to a discrete set of issues, encouraging nations to submit to juris-
diction without fear of the court extending its reach beyond the pre-
scribed limits.40 
 Nations will frequently attach further limits to jurisdiction under 
compromissory clauses in the form of preconditions such as negotia-
tion or other diplomatic resolution.41 Because states generally prefer to 
settle disputes through amicable compromise rather than adjudica-
                                                                                                                      
34 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 
Bevans 1179. 
35 See Hammer, supra note 33, at 497–98. 
36 See id. at 498. 
37 See Jonathan I. Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice, 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 855, 855 (1987). 
38 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women art. 29, ¶ 1, Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women]. 
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation 
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six 
months . . . the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitra-
tion, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice by request . . . . 
Id. 
39 See Application of Int’l Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (Geor. v. Russ.), Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 30 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Racial 
Discrimination Judgment]. 
40 See Charney, supra note 37, at 857. 
41 See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 90. 
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tion,42 many bilateral treaties—such as agreements of friendship, com-
merce, and navigation (FCN treaties), as well as multilateral agree-
ments regarding trade or human rights—will only permit resolution by 
a third party after the parties have attempted discussion.43 
 The court has advanced several theories underlying the require-
ment of negotiation as a precondition to jurisdiction.44 The role of ne-
gotiation was first discussed in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, a case 
before the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice (PCIJ).45 The PCIJ justified the negotiation requirement of the 
Mandate for Palestine by noting that “before a dispute can be made the 
subject of an action at law, its subject matter should have been clearly 
defined by means of diplomatic negotiations.”46 The court has inter-
preted the justification in the Mavrommatis opinion as guaranteeing 
notice to the respondent state, holding that negotiation requirements 
ensure that parties develop a clear picture of the scope of the dispute 
prior to adjudicatory proceedings.47 
 Mavrommatis offered other reasons to require attempts at diplo-
macy before allowing recourse to the PCIJ.48 The court recognized that 
agreement to jurisdiction is based on the express consent of the states 
involved, and that states thus have the right to impose limits on that 
consent.49 Nevertheless, the court noted that parties should have the 
ability to resort to adjudication, and that the precondition of negotia-
tions need not force the parties to exhaust all diplomatic remedies as 
long as they have notice of the issues involved.50 
 Similarly, the court found in the South West Africa Cases that even in 
the absence of direct diplomacy, nations may still satisfy the negotiation 
requirements of a compromissory clause.51 Jurisdiction in those cases 
was based on a compromissory clause in the Mandate for German 
South West Africa, which required that a dispute be one that “cannot 
                                                                                                                      
42 See John E. Noyes, The Functions of Compromissory Clauses in U.S. Treaties, 34 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 831, 854–55 (1994). 
43 See, e.g., Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 38, art. 29, ¶ 1; 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. XXIV, ¶ 2, Apr. 2, 1953, 
4 U.S.T. 2063. 
44 See Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 131. 
45 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 13–15 (Aug. 30). 
46 Id. at 15. 
47 See Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 131. 
48 See Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 13–16. 
49 See id. at 16. 
50 Id. at 13, 15. 
51 See South West Africa (Liber. v. S. Afr.; Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 346 (Dec. 21). 
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be settled by negotiation.”52 Although Ethiopia and Liberia had not 
formally negotiated with South Africa in accordance with their duties 
under the mandate, the court held that diplomacy conducted multilat-
erally through the United Nations was sufficient to sustain jurisdic-
tion.53 Because the multilateral discussions had demonstrated the na-
ture of the dispute and the low likelihood that future negotiation 
would resolve the issue, the court found that the compromissory clause 
had been satisfied.54 
 The court further lowered the threshold of what constituted ade-
quate diplomacy in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nic-
aragua, finding jurisdiction according to a similar clause in the FCN 
treaty between the United States and Nicaragua.55 The majority held 
that Nicaragua’s complaints to the Security Council and the U.S. gov-
ernment, despite failing to allege any specific violations of the FCN, 
had given the United States notice that Nicaragua considered its fund-
ing of the Contras a violation of international law.56 The court found 
such notice sufficient to sustain jurisdiction, rejecting the United 
States’ arguments that Nicaragua had made inadequate diplomatic ef-
forts to resolve the specific treaty violations.57 
 There has been a consistent group of dissenters, however, advocat-
ing for the reading of compromissory clauses as requiring direct bilat-
eral negotiations.58 These dissents have eschewed the emphasis on no-
tice that underlies the majority view, instead favoring the interpretation 
of compromissory clauses as encouraging states to achieve a mutually 
agreeable settlement before involving the ICJ.59 Spearheading this view, 
Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice wrote in South West Africa, “[General 
Assembly] discussions are, and necessarily must be, of too general and 
diffused a character to constitute a negotiation between the specific 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 335 (quoting Mandate for German South-West Africa art. 7, Dec. 17, 1920, 
League of Nations O.J. 89). 
53 Id. at 346. 
54 See id. 
55 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Pre-
liminary Objections, 1984 I.C.J. 392, ¶¶ 81, 83 (Nov. 26). 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 13, 122–25 (Dec. 2) (dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice); South West Africa Cases, 1962 I.C.J. at 562 (joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice). 
59 See Northern Cameroons, 1963 I.C.J. at 122–23 (dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmau-
rice). 
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parties . . . in relation to a specific dispute between them as States.”60 
Underlying these dissenters’ rejection of a looser standard was the un-
derstanding that negotiation preconditions were intended to promote 
settlement of the dispute through non-judicial means.61 Although the 
court has not yet embraced these dissents and prescribed a particular 
form of negotiations, it has begun to reaffirm the idea that negotiation 
requirements are intended not only to give notice, but also as efforts to 
reach a solution.62 
B. Negotiation and Jurisdiction in the CERD Case 
 The ICJ, finding jurisdiction to issue its provisional measures or-
der, extended the permissive reading espoused in its Nicaragua judg-
ment.63 Rejecting the Russian Federation’s contention that complain-
ing states must genuinely attempt to settle the issue by negotiation, the 
court held that Georgia satisfied Article 22 by disclosing the nature of 
the dispute to Russia, both directly, and through the United Nations 
(U.N.) in the days prior to its application.64 The ICJ explained that the 
critical function of negotiations in this context was to give Russia notice 
and an opportunity to respond to the allegations.65 The dissent, led by 
Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, objected to the court’s finding of juris-
diction, claiming that the order constituted a departure from estab-
lished ICJ practice requiring that negotiations be carried out in good 
faith until the parties reach an impasse.66 
 In its subsequent judgment, the ICJ backed down from the liberal 
application of the compromissory clause requirements in its provisional 
measures order, which equated bilateral contacts with negotiation.67 
The court reversed its finding of jurisdiction, holding that compromis-
sory clauses had permitted a finding of jurisdiction only where states 
engaged in some effort at diplomatic resolution and had reached a 
deadlock.68 The court did not contradict the holding of South West Af-
                                                                                                                      
60 South West Africa Cases, 1962 I.C.J. at 562 ( joint dissenting opinion of Judges Spender 
and Fitzmaurice). 
61 See id. 
62 See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 
2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 91 (Feb. 3) (distinguishing active attempts at negotiation from communica-
tions giving notice to the other party). 
63 See Racial Discrimination Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶¶ 114–117. 
64 See id. ¶¶ 103, 115. 
65 Id. ¶ 115. 
66 Id. ¶¶ 402–405 ( joint dissenting opinion of Vice President Al-Khasawneh et al.). 
67 See Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶¶ 157–159. 
68 Id. ¶ 159. 
42 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
rica permitting multilateral negotiations, but reiterated the need for a 
good-faith effort to reach a diplomatic solution.69 In explaining the role 
of negotiation preconditions, the court acknowledged that such clauses 
serve to notify the other party regarding the nature of the dispute, as it 
found in the order.70 Notably, the ICJ articulated alternative purposes 
for requiring pre-trial negotiations—chiefly that they encourage amica-
ble settlement of disputes—and marked an important limit on the con-
sent of states to jurisdiction.71 The court found that Georgia’s state-
ments to Russia—both direct statements and those made through the 
Security Council—were not made as good-faith attempts to initiate dip-
lomatic talks, and thus did not satisfy the requirements of Article 22 of 
the CERD.72 
III. Analysis 
 The ICJ, in its application of the CERD to the Georgia-Russia dis-
pute (CERD case), renewed the view that negotiations required by 
compromissory treaty clauses must be genuinely aimed at finding dip-
lomatic solutions to disputes brought before the court.73 Although not 
bound by precedent, the court affirmed the holdings of the South West 
Africa Cases and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua, which permit informal multilateral negotiations.74 The court em-
phasized that diplomacy as a precondition for jurisdiction serves more 
than a basic notice function.75 
 The ICJ’s refusal to find a mere exchange of parties’ viewpoints 
sufficient to support jurisdiction should help to promote its goal of dis-
pute settlement by negotiation.76 Reinforcement of a good-faith stan-
dard may ensure that a party will undertake some measure calculated 
to open diplomacy.77 Yet by affirming contradictory precedent, the 
court weakened its commitment to the justifications of consent and 
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. ¶¶ 158–160. 
70 Id. ¶ 131. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 181–182. 
73 Application of Int’l Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (Geor. v. Russ.), Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 157–90 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Racial 
Discrimination Judgment]. 
74 See id. ¶¶ 160–161. 
75 Id. ¶ 131. 
76 See id. ¶ 157. 
77 See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 143. 
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non-judicial resolution, instead of requiring direct negotiations.78 Re-
jecting the standards of Nicaragua and South West Africa would—despite 
imposing a higher barrier for ICJ jurisdiction—better guarantee that 
complaining states at least attempt to reach bona fide agreements be-
fore invoking the court.79 
A. The Possible Impact of the CERD Judgment 
 As the structural and substantive requirements for diplomacy have 
loosened, the view of such preconditions as mandating good-faith at-
tempts to resolve disputes has been applied inconsistently.80 The court 
has not articulated a bright-line test for what constitutes good faith, be-
cause pre-trial negotiations are often dependent on the circumstances 
of the dispute.81 
 The decision in the CERD case provided no new formal guid-
ance.82 It did, however, reinforce that one ultimate purpose of negotia-
tion is to resolve the dispute before recourse to the court.83 Thus, the 
court may in the future look more critically at the nature of and moti-
vation behind a nation’s statements and offers to negotiate.84 A height-
ened threshold for jurisdiction gives greater emphasis to good faith in 
achieving diplomatic resolution, which will in turn encourage states to 
make more than pro forma efforts at initiating consultation before turn-
ing to the court.85 
 An increase in good-faith offers of diplomacy by complainants may 
not necessarily result in more frequent negotiation.86 The current for-
mulation only requires a genuine offer by the complainant; it places no 
direct obligation on the responding state to accept, in part because of 
fears that forcing negotiation when neither party wishes to would be 
counterproductive.87 Therefore, as Georgia contended, when relations 
                                                                                                                      
78 See South West Africa (Liber. v. S. Afr.; Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 562–63 (Dec. 
21) ( joint dissenting opinion of Judges Spencer and Fitzmaurice). 
79 See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 140–41, 153. 
80 See id. at 140–41. 
81 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 15 (Aug. 30). 
82 See Racial Discrimination Judgment, 50 I.L.M. 607, ¶ 160. 
83 Id. ¶ 131. 
84 See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 152–53. 
85 Id. at 154. 
86 See Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When 
States Go to Arbitration Rather than Adjudication, 5 L. & Prac. Int’l Courts & Tribunals 
133, 133 (2006). 
87 See Charles Manga Fombad, Consultation and Negotiation in the Pacific Settlement of In-
ternational Disputes, 1 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 708, 718–19 (1989). 
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between the parties are extremely strained, a strict requirement for at-
tempted diplomacy may seem futile.88 
 Nevertheless, the burden of litigation adds significant pressure for 
the respondents to engage prospective complainants.89 Because adjudi-
cation can be time-consuming, states may wish to avoid submitting 
themselves to the court’s jurisdiction when another option is avail-
able.90 An application to the court for relief can take several years to 
proceed to trial.91 In the CERD case, the court did not render judg-
ment on the question of jurisdiction for over thirty months after Geor-
gia’s application.92 Furthermore, a dispute may implicate sensitive do-
mestic or political matters that states intend to keep secret or within 
sovereign control.93 In that instance, a state may wish to avoid exposing 
those issues publicly through the open proceedings of the ICJ.94 The 
ICJ has indicated, however, that it will not hesitate to hear a legal ques-
tion merely because it affects broader political issues, threatening not 
only states’ secrecy, but also, in some cases, their freedom to settle other 
aspects of disputes.95 In certain contexts, this pressure may cause states 
to negotiate outside of court to avoid prejudicing their ability to resolve 
matters on their own terms.96 Therefore, the majority’s appeal for a 
greater reliance on negotiation is consistent with many states’ prefer-
ence to resolve disputes without the need for adjudication.97 
B. Should Compromissory Clauses Require Direct Negotiation? 
 The ICJ’s decision, while promoting negotiated settlements, does 
not optimize conditions for negotiations by requiring direct diplo-
macy.98 Permitting multilateral diplomacy allows complainants to satisfy 
a negotiation requirement without attempting negotiation in an indi-
vidual capacity, thereby removing the benefits of confidentiality and 
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freedom to frame negotiations that a party would receive.99 If the court 
had imposed a duty to attempt direct discussions, compromissory 
clauses would restrict the diplomatic avenues available to states.100 Un-
der such an obligation, however, disputing parties may be more likely 
to attempt alternative forms of resolution before resorting to the unfa-
vorable procedures of the court.101 
 Considering diplomacy in multilateral settings sufficient to satisfy 
compromissory clause requirements may pose problems that decrease 
the likelihood of negotiated settlements.102 The structure of the U.N. 
and similar bodies lends itself to disputation, debate, and joint action, 
but is not conducive to meaningful negotiation.103 The multiplicity of 
parties often leads to discussions that extend beyond the scope of the 
immediate disagreement, undermining the parties’ ability to define the 
dispute bilaterally.104 In the context of a bilateral dispute, such as that 
in the CERD case, the presence of additional parties detracts from dis-
cussion of the immediate issues and incentivizes political posturing.105 
Furthermore, an open debate before the General Assembly does not 
afford the confidentiality of bilateral negotiations.106 A responding state 
seeking to avoid interference in political matters receives no advantage 
through open debate, as its issues are subject to public scrutiny if it 
chooses to negotiate a solution by multilateral channels.107 
 Proponents of multilateral diplomacy point to its virtues, one of 
which is the benefit of bringing international pressure to bear upon a 
party.108 An obstinate state inclined to disregard a complainant’s offers 
of diplomacy may be convinced to accept them through the interces-
sion of third states.109 For instance, one can point to French interven-
tion as instrumental in negotiating peace between Georgia and Russia 
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in August 2008.110 The benefits derived from multilateralism are not 
incompatible with an obligation to engage directly.111 Parties may gen-
erate debate in the United Nations to help bring a party to the table, or 
may seek the assistance of a third party to help organize settlement.112 
Nevertheless, many such uses of third parties, including recourse to the 
Security Council, require direct negotiation in the background to fully 
achieve their aims.113 In the absence of direct diplomacy, denunciations 
by third states serve to highlight the existence of a dispute without 
promoting a mutually agreeable resolution.114 
 The court’s view of compromissory clauses as promoting negotia-
tion115 would therefore be better served by mandating direct diplomacy, 
which would provide states with conditions more conducive to diplo-
matic settlement.116 This does not guarantee, however, that respondents 
would elect negotiated agreement over the procedures of the court.117 
Nevertheless, giving states the opportunity to negotiate directly ensures 
that jurisdiction is not invoked without the consent of the disputants.118 
In its CERD judgment, the ICJ noted that negotiation preconditions in 
compromissory clauses, in addition to simply promoting settlement, 
serve as limits on a party’s consent to jurisdiction.119 Requiring bona 
fide attempts at negotiation would avoid the risk of unwanted adjudica-
tion, making any ultimate judicial settlement seem legitimate and rea-
sonable to the states involved.120 
Conclusion 
 Although the ICJ has not imposed the optimal conditions for fruit-
ful negotiation, it has nonetheless laid the groundwork for future 
courts to conduct a more rigorous analysis of states’ efforts to negoti-
ate. The court’s caution against requiring too high or too formal of a 
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threshold may be interpreted as recognition that states’ rights of access 
to the court should not be unduly restricted. However, the refusal to 
mandate a particular form or substance in diplomacy may itself be cal-
culated to promote negotiation. Knowledge that lack of a diplomatic 
settlement will result in litigation adds pressure for a respondent to en-
gage fully, although a prohibitive rule may encourage respondent states 
to delay with perceived impunity. Nevertheless, diplomacy can be direct 
without being unduly burdensome or lengthy. Unless the ICJ requires 
diplomacy in a form that removes the disincentives of adjudication for 
a respondent, states may perceive preconditions of negotiation in a 
compromissory treaty clause as an illusory safeguard of their interests, 
and refuse to accept the court’s jurisdiction on those terms. 
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